Category: Non-Invasive Archaeology

Looking at different conceptualizations of wilderness in environmental aesthetics illustrated how human understandings of the aesthetic engagement construct our judgments and valuing of environments (Cronon, 1996). The dynamic manifestations of wilderness centered around concepts like beauty and sublime do not merely present nature as a classical object of aesthetic experience but they emphasize human perceptual qualities as the determinant of aesthetic experiences. In other words, aesthetic experience is largely human-constructed which shapes the whole idea behind Nature’s aesthetic value. However, the sole focus on the ‘natural’ landscape in aesthetic conceptualizations discriminates between a component of the landscape created by natural processes and one created by human cultural actions. This perhaps marks Arntzen and Brady’s goal, in Humans in the Land, to shift environmental aesthetics and ethics away from ‘wilderness’ or ‘natural landscapes’ towards humanized landscapes (Arntzen & Brady, 2008). In line with this, I will frame Al-Zubarah as a cultural aesthetic subject, an alternative view to nature aesthetics in an attempt to value its landscape.

Al-Zubarah as a cultural landscape produces an aesthetic experience. Environmental aesthetics is largely concerned with the environmental character of natural objects as opposed to the object-centered approach typical of the art of artifacts, where the aesthetic object is conceived as relatively static and bounded. However, lifeless attributes of cultural landscapes stem from human perceptions, thoughts, imaginings, knowledge, and emotion. Simply, we conditioned our minds to think of them as ‘too lifeless’ to be considered an aesthetic experience while we scrutinize naturalness as in value aesthetics. The way nature is admired for its mesmerizing sceneries, converging colors, and addictive touch is all cognitively produced by humans. In the same way we aptly describe nature in terms of its aesthetic appeal could be exactly applied in the presence of culture-created landscapes. We can aesthetically conceive of the al-Zubarah beyond its practical concerns or economic value. Implementing the aesthetic narrative in al-Zubarah archaeological processes allows us to think of destructive archaeology as disruptive to our aesthetic conceptualizations of the site. In this sense, invasive archaeology is not merely physical, as in destroying pure forms of al-zubarah artifacts, but it significantly disturbs our aesthetic appreciation for its pure artifact. Alternatively, the landscape preservation efforts are the preservation of human-created aesthetic meanings.

Although the aesthetic appreciation of the environment is often deemed insignificant in conservation and preservation due to its subjective nature, one must understand its importance in igniting environmental movements. Nature as an aesthetic experience, however, is yet centralized in theoretical and practical discussions of environmentalism. Nonetheless, with the slow shift from environmental aesthetics’ sole focus on the natural environment to human-produced environments, this discipline became inclusive of all non-human entities, including non-living beings. The aesthetics of objects and environments (artificial and natural) are not only appreciated because of how they are produced in human cognitive formulations but they open for non-cognitive components such as scientific knowledge and cultural traditions. In this sense, we do not only conceive of the al-zubarah in our imaginary realm but also how its cultural significance comes into play. Combining cognitive and non-cognitive elements of environmental aesthetics minimizes/eliminates the discipline’s superficiality that critics have pointed out. This presents non-invasive archaeological preservation/excavation as not just necessarily for our aesthetic narratives that I previously talked about, but how it is important due to its cultural symbolism for Qatar.

References:

Arntzen, S., & Brady, E. (2008). Humans in the land: The Ethics and aesthetics of the Cultural Landscape. Google Books. Unipub. Retrieved October 16, 2022, from https://books.google.com.qa/books?id=quwJAQAAMAAJ&printsec=front_cover&redir_esc=y.

Carlson, A. (2019, April 9). Environmental aesthetics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 16, 2022, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/environmental-aesthetics/

Cronon, W. (1996). The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature.   Environmental History, 1(1), 7–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/3985059

Gardiner, S. M., & Thompson, A. (2019). Aesthetic value, Nature and Environment . In The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics (pp. 186–196). essay, Oxford University Press.

In non-invasive archaeological traditions, it is the archaeologist’s duty to cautiously preserve cultural and natural heritage without adopting destructive excavating technology that alters its landscape. From this perspective, archaeologists are inherently just-either consciously or subconsciously- just towards their landscape, even if they are guided by intuition rather than a strict landscape ethical framework. However, the most important factor in determining whether preservation archaeology embraces land ethic understandings is if its practices conceive of serving environmental and ecological interests as a prerequisite to serving a higher entity, humans. In land ethics, which Leopold had contrasted against the prevailing anthropocentrism of his time, the role of “Homo sapiens (shifts) from conqueror of the land-community to plain . . . citizen” (Leopold, 1949). Humans are merely citizens of a large community where all members- humans, and nonhumans- matter; the boundaries of the community include soils, waters, plants, and animals; or collectively: the land.

Non-invasive archaeology is not solely a practice, but a mindset that intrinsically values the landscape over the ego-centric needs of individuals. Under human-centric archaeological traditions, value resides in a particular kind of aesthetic experience – scenic beauty – and in the resources and services that the landscape provides for human beings. Human interests in amenity and utility are what matter and human beings are the agents who can provide for or deny those interests. The transition to land ethics decentralizes the human agent, and in extreme versions, completely separates the human from the landscape, such as in the wilderness case we discussed in previous classes. However, land ethics, in Leopold’s terms, accords moral standing to all the agents contributing to a landscape to ensure an undisrupted, interdependent relationship between humans and non-human members without disregarding the distinctiveness of each entity. These relationships come in different forms: social (human-human relations), material (human-object relations), and ecological (nonhuman-nonhuman relations), and they are all united by the landscape they occupy. Land ethics establishes the ethical basis that protects a community of land against any human-created threats by protecting the land to which all entities belong.

The landscape is a matter of relationships; it is always a plural concept that involves complex networks of relationships. Land-either natural or cultural-cannot be perceived as a lifeless entity because landscapes are living in the sense that it embraces all forms of life. In this context, archaeologists conceptualize landscape as a meaningful environment that must be protected by non-destructive methods. An ethical landscape practice must concern itself with landscape justice to serve the greater community’s justice (humans, animals, objects, soil, air, and generally the land). The principle of landscape justice points to an equitable entitlement to circumstances of living that are characterized by good landscape relationships. It is important to maintain such relations by refraining from introducing any external threats no matter how insignificantly it affects the community’s members. Al-Zubarah’s case, which I mentioned in my previous blogs, gives a great example to how an ethical landscape is practiced as non-invasive technology is favored to conduct safe conservation actions that respect the land of al-Zubarah.

Leopold, A., Schwartz, C. W., Bradley, N. L., Leopold, A. C., & Leopold, E. B. (2007). The land ethic. In A Sand County Almanac (pp. 201–226). essay, Land Ethic Press; The Aldo Leopold Foundation.

To some extent in contemporary environmental philosophies, nonhuman natural entities are granted moral standing independent of human-centric interests. Human-created ‘objects’ or ‘things’ are overlooked in environmental ethics because of their mere ontological relationship with humans. Consider the character of archaeological artifacts. Artifacts are conceived and designed to meet the demands of human need and purpose, thus, they are fundamentally anthropocentric as their meanings derive from the concerns of human agents, either as individual personas or as social institutions. Ethical considerations of non-living considerations cannot go beyond the constraints of human function. In this sense, they are only seen as valuable for their cultural and historical significance. Al-Zubarah fort, as my case study, consistently undergoes site preservation, research, and community engagement to continue its human legacy as part of UNESCO world heritage. The Al-Zubarah’s importance for Qatari history demands a careful archaeological excavation to restore and protect parts of Qatar that flourished long ago. It is clear that preserving culture lies at the center of Qatar’s artifact archaeological efforts, and not because of its intrinsic values independent of cultural interests.

Jane Bennett, in her book Vibrant Matter, is challenging her readers to abandon their human-centric worldview, specifically where we conceive of there being inanimate matter (in my case, artifacts) and animated life (us) (a binary view that she posits is the dominant way of approaching our world), and asks us to understand things as complex “vibrant” (a term that she uses throughout her book) materials constantly interacting with one another in not fully determinate ways. By believing that matter has vitality and life no matter how lifeless it may appear to be, we promote more responsible, ethical human engagement with our world and ensure the long-term survival of the planet. This is Bennett’s theory of vital materialism. All physical materials have their own unique agentic capacity, trajectories, interactions, and potentialities outside of, and distinct from, human agency. Although this is a hard concept to grasp, as Bennett suggests, she points to the fact that all inanimate objects change over time. The only reason why Al-Zubarah requires preservation is to protect its coral walls against long-term erosion which shows that al-zubarah will not always stay in its original form. Quite simply, things act and groups of things act together because of their vibrant characteristic which renders them agency and intrinsic value beyond anthropocentric conceptions.

Obviously, I am not trying to alter non-invasive archaeological processes carried out in The Al-Zubarah but I am presenting the site as an intrinsically valuable object that requires preservation not because it serves cultural purposes, but just because it as a respected entity on its own. In Chapter 1, “The Force of Things,” Bennett develops the concept of thing-power. Thing-power is the agency of material objects to act and impact other materials, thereby producing effects in the world. Under such conditions, we stress on the agency of inanimate objects because they are able of interacting with its surrounding.